Not really, okay I am going to give you the back of the napkin black box operation.
So you lease the instance and spin it up from the console. The first thing you do is set up a SSH key only access instance so from the moment its spun up, the only logins will be from a key that the hosting service is not privy to.
Once established and you make a shell connection, you can SEE how many logins there are and there will be only you. Ok then you set up a virtual machine within that system that maps to the NIC of the host.
Now you have a virtual machine inside a virtual machine that the host service has no access to.
that second virtual machine's secure shell login is set to a non-rotating one time pad that is delivered while monitoring virtual machine 1 for alternate logins. If at any time it is suspected, the entire instance can be wiped and the one time pads discarded and a new pair generated and the process begun again
Once the nested virtual machine is operating, its memory operations are also encrypted by the one time pad, provided it was uploaded completely within the window where you were the only logged in user to VM 1, this means even with the most sophisticated memory reading technology, without that one time pad the data is unreadable, and the only way to get the pad is to have been watching while the pad was uploaded to the 2nd virtual machine.
In this scenario since we have maintained theoretically perfect end to end encryption thrice over, so the one time pad doesn't need to be large, because when you get to the end of the shared key list the last record can be used to safely transmit another arbitrarily large one time pad.
The ONLY way this scenario is compromised is:
- A compromised kernel and since we are being careful with our distros, we know it is valid and tested by millions of man hours, this is unlikely
- Someone using a quantum computer to crack the public key set used to secure the 2nd virtual machine via direct reading of the physical server's memory, jumping in as an invisible Man in the Middle attack in the time between the 2nd instance is spun up and the first one time pad record is received (we are talking fractions of a second)
And EVEN THEN they just have the digits of the one time pad don't contain their method, that's in the 2nd VMs kernel and is unreadable in memory unless you can guess the method perfectly the first time.
Let me give you an example, this is ridiculously simplified:
say the one time pad first entry is:
5TF7M828D3
and the method is 'add the hex value of every 3rd character and xor it with the hex value of every 2nd character', and that is the base encoding for the private key that will be secure
See?
you can be aware of the string: 5TF7M828D3, but not know how to manipulate it to get the desired secure private key